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0. Abstract 
In this article the evolution of vitality of social systems in water governance processes, 
approached as social-ecological systems, is studied. Vitality as well as conditions for vitality 
are theorized and measured in two cases of the Dutch southwest Delta region. Different 
patterns and developments in the rise and fall of vitality are found in the two cases. We 
followed the developments of five conditions explaining the discovered changes in the levels 
of vitality throughout the years in the two cases. The first conclusion is that the conditions 
can be treated as clear enablers for increasing the level of vitality in both cases. 
Furthermore, a low score on (most of) the conditions are accompanied with low scores on 
vitality. The second conclusion that we can draw from our case comparative research deals 
with the relationship among the five conditions. We found two distinct types of relationships 
among the conditions: (1) a substituting, and (2) a mutually reinforcing relationship. The 
latter relationship is witnessed in ‘big jumps in the level of vitality  from low scores to high 
scores on vitality. The first relationship is discovered in certain phases of the cases, which 
maintain a certain high level of vitality.  
Key words: vitality, conditions, water governance, social systems, trust, informal networks, 
case comparison 
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1. Introduction  
In contemporary literature on complex social-ecological systems, the need for adaptive 
capacity is stressed (e.g. Folke et al, 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). It is argued that adaptive 
capacity is needed to deal with both the uncertainty of ecosystem dynamics as with the 
interdependencies resulting from social system’s complexity (Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Van 
Meerkerk et al., 2013). This capacity of actors often pinpoints the quality of interaction 
among actors in the social system (Lubell and Edelenbos, 2013). Vitality is a concept that can 
be used to indicate the high quality interactions among actors (Healy, 1995; Horlings et al, 
2009). Vital actor relationships provide the trustworthy context to explore and find new 
alternatives and solutions to complex issues (Folke et al, 2005). Vitality of social systems is a 
potentially interesting concept as is inhibits a double-meaning including both the explorative 
quality and the exploitative or productive quality of actor relationships, but needs more 
empirical grounding. 
In this article, we want to dig deeper in the concept of vitality. We specifically aim to 
find conditions for vitality to emerge and increase. Different conditions are (implicitly) 
mentioned in the literature in this matter, such as trust, constructive dialogue and 
institutional cooperative arrangements (e.g. Healey, 1995; Horlings et al., 2009; Innes and 
Booher, 2004). Folke et al. (2005) and Huitema et al. (2009), reviewing the adaptive 
governance literature, stress the importance of participatory approaches, the sharing of 
information between actors, experimentation and learning of actors to adapt to changing 
circumstances and trustworthy actor relationships for dealing with complex social-ecological 
issues. However, empirical studies providing evidence-based insights in the relation between 
these conditions on the one hand and vitality on the other hand are very scarce. Our leading 
research question therefore is: which conditions can be considered important in developing 
and maintaining vitality of social systems in water governance practices?  
In this article we try to provide empirical insights in this matter through conducting a 
comparative case study of water governance practices in the Netherlands. Water 
governance systems can be considered as complex social-ecological systems as many 
stakeholders (from governmental, societal and private sectors) with diverging interests and 
values deliberate and negotiate wicked, erratic and unpredictable issues (Teisman et al., 
2009; Pahl-Wostl, 2007).  
The article is structured as follows. In section 2 we build our theoretical framework 
and discuss the concept of vitality and conditions for vital social systems. In section 3 we 
discuss methodological issues and measurement of the main variables. Section 4 is devoted 
to empirical description and analysis of the two cases in subsequent order. In section 5 we 
compare insights gained from the two cases and draw several conclusions from this case 
comparison.  
  
 
2. Vital Actor Relations: Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Water governance as social-ecological systems 
In this article we depict water governance systems as complex social-ecological systems 
(SES). This term emphasizes the integrated concept of humans in nature and stress that the 
delineation between social ecological systems is artificial and arbitrary. Social systems and 
ecological systems have reciprocal feedbacks and act as complex adaptive systems (Berkes 
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and Folke, 1998; Folke et al, 2005). In fully understanding regional water governance 
systems one needs to understand the individual parts of social and ecological systems as 
well as their interplay and interdependency. Challenges in the water sector take place in 
multi-actor and governance settings in which many actors (private, public and societal) from 
different sectors (ecology, nature, agriculture, flood risk, etc.) and scales (local, regional and 
(trans)national) are involved (Edelenbos et al, 2013). The role and importance of vital actor 
relations is often stressed as an important condition to deal effectively, timely and 
legitimately with unpredictable and disruptive changes (Healey, 1995; Horlings et al., 2009; 
Innes and Booher, 2004).  
 
2.2 Vital social systems 
In the literature of SES many sources are mentioned that are considered important for 
adaptive (co)management, such as trust, informal networks, social learning, etc. (Folke et al, 
2005). In our view these sources touch upon the vitality of social systems in order to cope 
with the uncertain and complex character of social-ecological systems. The aspects of trust 
and informal learning networks touch upon the relational qualities of social systems (Klijn et 
al, 2010). The relational capacity in social systems is considered important for adaptive and 
flexible responses to changes in ecological systems (Berkes and Folke, 1998). 
Vitality in actor relationships is strongly related to the concept of governance 
capacity, and specifically relational capacity (Innes and Booher, 2003; Foster-Fishman et al, 
2001). This form of capacity focuses on quality of the relations and interactions among 
involved actors.  The literature on (governance) networks also stresses the importance of 
high-quality actor relationships. Vital systems are those social systems in which actors have 
productive interdependent relationships and in which actors frequently meet and exchange 
visions, meaning, interests, information and knowledge (cf. Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; 
Healey, 2006). Vital actor relations develop joint fact finding and mutual understanding of 
problem situations (Healey, 1995). Actor relations are not dominated by conflicts or 
deadlocks, but are characterized by ongoing interaction leading to joint strategies to solve 
problems. In other words, there is vital interaction which is lively, energizing and productive; 
it deals with the capacity to act (Horlings et al, 2009). 
Vitality is a double-meaning concept that stresses both exploration (learning, 
reflexivity) and consolidation (productivity, exploitation) (Scharpf, 1999). Relationships in 
complex socio-ecological systems that are exclusively characterized by exploration, learning 
and reflexivity are not vital as they waste resources and are not consolidates in explicit 
results. The same holds for exclusive exploitation: this is not considered vital as it leads to 
routinized behavior and bureaucratized ways of working that don’t meet the specific nature 
and situation of disruptive changes and extreme conditions (Scharpf, 1999; Folke et al, 
2005).  
 Vitality of social systems concerns with the capacity of individuals to create both 
energizing and productive relations among actors and the quality of those actor relations 
(Horlings et al, 2009; Innes and Booher, 2003). Energizing means activating people to 
become part of interaction processes, while productive means that this energy is also 
consolidated in output and outcome (Innes and Booher, 2003). Vitality not only deals with 
the quality of the process of collaboration, but also with the quality of the content resulting 
from that process. It is then about consolidation of collaboration in joint agreements, 
common ground and (intermediate) (project) results. In this article we therefore define a 
vital system as “a social system of actors with different backgrounds and from different 
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scales and levels with lively, energetic and productive relationships that are constantly 
seeking to explore, develop, and consolidate common ground in dealing with complex water 
governance issues”.  
Much literature in the field of for example network theory (cf. Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004) and complex governance systems (Teisman et al, 2009; Wagenaar, 2007) stress the 
importance of creating common perspectives, connecting different values and interest, as 
many complex spatial and water governance processes face the challenge of getting from 
fragmented to collective action. The coordination and combination of interests and values 
are seen as crucial in getting to collaboration and problem-solving processes (Healy, 2006).  
Moreover, the common ground in dealing with water governance issues can be 
reflected by the degree to which  different time orientations of  involved actors have been 
synchronized to common time orientations (Zerubavel, 2003; Eshuis en van Buuren, 2013). 
This implies that short-term policy formulation and implementation needs constant 
reconsideration and alignment in the light of long-term expectations and future 
perspectives. It is also the other way around, long-term policy formulation needs reflection 
of the short-term developments in the policy field (c.f. Edelenbos et al, 2013). Vitality in this 
respect also reflects the way and the extent these different time orientations interact and 
got aligned. 
 
2.3 Conditions to increase vitality  
In the literature on social-ecological systems and complex (water) governance systems 
different conditions are considered and assumed important for the creation of vitality in 
these systems (Foster-Fishman et al, 2001; Folke et al, 2005). In this section we pay attention 
to several conditions that are mostly mentioned and discussed. We say beforehand that 
these conditions should not be approached isolated but as a configuration.  
 
1. Sense of urgency 
A common sense of urgency among actors in the actor network is considered important for 
vitality of governance networks (Kotter, 2008), as when actors feel the need for issues and 
problems they are more willing and committed to invest in active participation in the 
governance network and to reach effective and supported results (Edelenbos et al, 2010; 
Ostrom, 1998). Different forms of sense of urgency can be distinguished (Van Rooy, 2006). 
First there is policy (or top down) urgency: policy actors from different sectors see and feel 
the urgency of the issue. Second, one can distinguish bottom up urgency: all kind of 
stakeholders from society (NGOs, citizens, local stakeholders, etc.) feel the urgency to start 
self-organizing capacity in dealing with (local) issues. Vital networks are characterized by a 
mutually felt sense of urgency: policy urgency and bottom up urgency is felt and developed 
at the same time (Van Rooy, 2006). If one of the two is missing or lacking vitality will be out 
or reach, as there is no common feeling of the need to spend and to invest time, energy and 
other resources. 
2. Cross-boundary informal networks 
Vitality requires informal networks that transcend formal organizational structures and 
boundaries. Informal networks could enhance the vitality of social-ecological systems, 
because they can provide access to different kind of resources (or capital), for example 
information, financial resources and (legal) power (e.g. Granovetter, 1973; Folke et al., 
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2005). Informal social networks refer to settings in which interaction is less structured by 
formal and detailed rules. Ashmos et al. (2000) argue that informal structures contributed to 
sharing of information between people. Furthermore, the informal character of the 
networks provides room for involved actors to think and behave outside their established 
roles and rules according to their formal position within established institutions. People are 
not directly pinned down to or held accountable for using certain statements. In this way 
informal meetings give more room for experimentation and exploration.  
In informal networks, boundary spanning activities become important in building and 
activating relationships among different actors in the governance network (Van Meerkerk 
and Edelenbos, 2014). These boundary spanning activities activate actor relationships and in 
this way the exchange of information, knowledge, resources and perceptions. Especially 
face-to-face communication in these informal networks is considered crucial as it not only 
makes mutual alignment of strategies possible, but “…exchanging mutual commitment (…) 
creating and reinforcing norms, and developing a group identity appear to be the most 
important processes that make communication efficacious” (Ostrom, 1998: 7).  
3. Constructive dialogue 
Regarding the vitality of social systems, it is important to consider in what ways actors 
approach each other. A hostile and conflict-based approach will not be favorable for the 
development of vitality in actor networks, as communication and interaction will become 
minimal and based on fixed and formalized positions (Foster-Fishman et al, 2001; Healey, 
2006; Innes and Booher, 2003). As is shown in governance network literature, hard-nosed 
bargaining will not lead to vitality in social systems. Instead, due deliberation, if it is 
organized properly, increases exchange of information, perceptions, and preferences, by 
which a learning process can take place and governance network performance could 
improve (Van Meerkerk et al., 2015). “The main reason is that arguing and reason-giving 
provide a mechanism to probe and challenge the normative validity of actors’ interests as 
well as to check the empirical facts on which policy choices are based” (Risse and Kleine, 
2007: 73-74).  
The dialogue has to be ‘open’ or authentic: actors have to be “able to follow a 
discussion where it leads rather than be artificially constrained by rules about what can be 
discussed or what cannot be changed in the system, practice or law” (Innes and Booher, 
2003: 38). This creates flexibility and the ability to mutual adjust to each other’s points of 
view, interests and core values. Furthermore, it should be inclusive. In this way a variety of 
viewpoints, interests and values can be developed and communicated (Wagenaar, 2007). 
Moments of variation give individual actors the opportunity to put forward their own 
agenda.  
4. Trust 
Trust is recurrent aspect in the literature on social-ecological systems and adaptive 
governance (Adger et al, 2005; 2003; Folke et al, 2005). It is assumed that trust positively 
influences relation-building and the development of social capital in social systems and thus 
leads to vitality increase in social systems. Trusting another actor means that one is willing to 
assume an open and vulnerable position. One expects the other actor to refrain from 
opportunistic behavior even if the opportunity for it arises without having any guarantee 
that the other party will indeed act as expected (Deakin and Michie, 1997). Thus, the actor 
6 
 
believes and expects that the other actor will take both actors’ interests into account in the 
interaction (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Klijn et al (2010) distinguishes a number of aspects that together give shape to trust 
in complex social systems, of which two are used in this research: absence of opportunistic 
behavior and reliability. Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or 
system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events (Sako, 1998). Reliability means that 
actors keep in mind the intentions of the other parties. The absence of opportunistic 
behavior is also considered a requirement for the development of trust among actors in the 
social system. Some authors argue that trust means that actors do not exploit other actors’ 
vulnerability (Rousseau et al, 1998; Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998).  
5. Institutional cooperation arrangement 
Vital actor networks need certain formalization in an institutional embedding. An 
institutional arrangement is needed between partners to enhance and consolidate 
interaction and cooperation (Hodge and Greve, 2005). Institutional arrangements have 
different forms. It can be strictly formalized in arrangements like a steering committee, but 
can also be less formalized like alliances which function on a more ad hoc basis (Steijn et al, 
2011). These rather low formalized institutional arrangements can be rather informal and 
can take the form of an informal project group, newly established consortiums or other 
hybrid organizational forms (Faulkner, 1995). 
Apart from the exact level of formalization, institutional arrangements regulate the 
interaction between actors involved in the social system (March and Olson, 1989). According 
to Scharpf (1997:38) these institutions can be seen as “a system of rules that structure the 
courses of actions that a set of actors may choose”. Institutional arrangements assure a 
certain stability and predictability in social behavior of and interactions between actors. 
Formalization via institutional arrangements assists the consolidation and productivity of 
vital actor relationships in the social system (Steijn et al, 2011).  
 
3. Methodology and measurement 
In our research a number of key variables can be distinguished, which set the conceptual and 
analytical framework in studying the two case studies Haringvliet and Grevelingen.  
Below the main variables are listed, defined and operationalized: 
Table 1: description and operationalization of the main variables in the research 
Main variables Nature  Definition Indicators 
Vitality Depended 
variable 
A social system of actors with 
different backgrounds and from 
different scales and levels with 
energetic and productive 
relationships that are constantly 
seeking both to explore and 
consolidate common ground in 
dealing with water governance 
issues 
- Energetic: lively exploration of   
perspectives, interests and values 
- Productive: consolidation 
(exploitation) by finding common 
ground reflected by a) aligned  time 
orientations, and b)  aligned 
interests and values across 
governmental scales 
Sense of urgency Independent 
variable 
The level of joint feeling of the 
need of actors involved for 
issues, problems and/or solutions  
- Presence of policy urgency 
- Presence of bottom up urgency 
Cross-boundary Independent Temporary ad hoc structures  - Set up of multi-actor face to face, 
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informal 
networks 
variable that cross formal organizational 
structures that are attended by 
different actors with different 
organizational backgrounds  
informal meetings 
- Channeling frequent information 
exchange organized by boundary 
spanners 
Constructive 
dialogue 
Independent 
variable 
A  communication process 
focused on the exchange of  
information focused on 
developing mutual understanding  
(not based on fixed positions and 
stands)  
- Due deliberation among actors in 
the system 
- Open and inclusive dialogue  
Trust Independent 
variable 
A stable positive expectation that 
actor A has (or predicts he has) of 
the intentions and motives of 
actor B in refraining from 
opportunistic behavior, even if 
the opportunity arises. 
- Actors in the social system keep in 
mind the intentions of the other 
parties in finding solutions 
- Actors do not use the contributions 
of other actors for their own 
advantage 
Institutional 
cooperation 
arrangement 
Independent 
variable 
A set of formal rules and working 
procedures that structure the 
courses of action in a cooperation 
process  
- Presence of a joint working 
structure, like project group, 
steering group, etc. 
- The level that these rules are used 
to structure the interaction process 
 
The indicators were for each case scored on a Likert 5 point scale: each indicator was scored 
from 1 (low score) till 5 (high score). Each variable is measured by two indicators, leading to 
a summation ranging from 2 till 10. We interpreted a score of 10 as double plus (++), 9-8 as a 
single plus (+), 7-5 as plus minus (+/-), 4-3 as single minus (-) and the score 2 as double minus 
(--).  The scoring is done in a number of tables in order to provide a clear overview on the 
independent and depended variables. The scores are always substantiated in “explanatory 
words”, as scoring doesn’t always speak for itself. In this way the quantitative expression is 
always accompanied by qualitative clarification.   
3.1 Case selection 
The cases of Haringvliet and Grevelingen have been selected for the comparative case study 
research. One the one hand they are selected on the ground of similarity. Both cases: 
- find their origin in the issue of (threatening) water quality; 
- deal with a complex interrelated set of issues: water quality, water quantity, 
recreation, agriculture, and ecology and nature;  
- are set at a regional scale (transcend local circumstances); 
- represent a variety of actors with different interests, viewpoints and values, 
operating at different scales or governmental levels; 
- represent the presence of different time orientations of actors, varying from the 
short to the long term; 
- both are located in the South-Western part of Delta of the Netherlands. 
Hence, in many ways these two cases are similar and therefore provide good starting 
conditions for exploring the meaning of conditions in creating vital social networks/systems. 
However, we also expect that there are considerable differences in both cases when it 
comes to the vitality of the governance system. The Haringvliet case – focused upon the 
decision to change the management of the sluices – is characterized by several 
implementation problems, partly due to conflicts between some local stakeholders and 
initiating regional and national governmental actors (Van Meerkerk et al., 2013; Kuijken, 
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2010). The Grevelingen on the other hand is less characterized by conflict. In this case a 
renewal of the water system is discussed, bringing back the former estuarine dynamics to 
improve the water quality. A more constructive dialogue between stakeholders seems to 
exist in the Grevelingen.  
We conducted theory-informed case studies in a focused way, to empirically analyse 
a particular theoretically relevant issue, vitality in social systems, and generate new 
theoretical knowledge from the empirical analysis. It comprises an instrumental case study, 
in which the researcher uses a specific case to gain more understanding about a particular 
phenomenon of interest (Stake 1995). The research design of two case studies does not 
enable us to develop generalized empirical knowledge but it does provide a detailed 
understanding of contextual and situational conditions that influence the evolution of vital 
social systems and the interplay between different conditions of vitality. We used the cases 
to test and to develop new insights (emerging from the cases) in finding explanatory 
conditions for vitality in regional water governance systems approached as complex socio-
ecological systems.  
 
3.2 Methods used 
Case Haringvliet 
At the time of writing, we have been following the Haringvliet case for about four years. All 
relevant written documents were subjected to detailed study, such as policy documents, 
memos, technical reports, and council minutes. Next, we conducted 20 semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders (national government, province, local government, water 
boards, NGOs, agriculture representatives). Firstly, the process and history of the cases were 
reconstructed. Secondly, questions were asked about the indicators mentioned in table 1. 
These interviews lasted about 1,5 hours on average, and the interview reports were checked 
and controlled by the respondents. Furthermore, we observed eight meetings between 
stakeholders and experts concerning the issue. These occasions were used to observe 
stakeholder interactions and to check our findings derived from the interviews and the 
document analysis.  
Case Grevelingen 
The case Grevelingen was qualitatively studied in two parts. The first 2 rounds were studied 
from a reconstructive perspective (Thomas, 2011). This was done merely by studying policy 
documents. Three additional interviews were held to enlighten several insights obtained 
from document analysis. The last two rounds (from 2010 on) were studied longitudinal with 
embedded research. One of the researchers observed around 30 meetings of the project 
organisations from 2010 onwards and was actively involved in several meetings as a 
secretary. These meetings consist of administrative meetings, project organization meetings 
and public conferences. Next to this, also in these rounds 9 interviews with key actors 
(national government, province, local government, water boards, NGOs, agriculture representatives) 
were held. At last a set of email messages and conversations were studied. In the last part of 
the research, the results were validated by reflections of members of the project 
organization.  
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Both cases are reconstructed and analyzed in rounds (Teisman, 2000). Each round can be 
considered a case within the case of both Grevelingen and Haringvliet. For each case the 
rounds were scored for vitality and the conditions. Subsequently the rounds in each case 
were compared and changes in levels of vitality and conditions became apparent.  
Working process on analysis and scoring 
We want to explicitly report on the working process regarding the scoring and analysis of the 
cases. Two authors were distinct “case owners”; they were held responsible for retrieving 
data for their specific cases. They used secondary document analysis and interviewing as 
research methods for obtaining data on their case. The case owners, first, made a first draft 
case study description in which the main variables (figure 1) were analyzed, scored and 
explained. These drafts case study reports were then subjected to a joint process in which 
the three authors discussed the analysis and scoring of the two cases. In an open and 
reflexive discussion the scoring was questioned (by the two other authors) and explained by 
the case owners. The case owner provided the scores based on his case analysis. Then, the 
scores were discussed and the co-authors cross-read the cases in order to find out whether 
they would provide the same score to the variables. The goals of this joint and open 
discussion among the three researchers were to get a common understanding and use of the 
analytical framework and operationalized variables, and to perform a check on the way the 
case owner interpreted the case using and scoring the variables. We repeated this process in 
total 4 times during a time period of 5 months, in which we again and again elaborated, 
explained, and fine-tuned the case analysis and scoring of the variables. These meetings 
were highly important for making sure that the scores in both cases were based on a 
mutually shared framework for scoring. This process also improved the inter-rater reliability. 
This circular communication process led to case study reports which were rather lengthy and 
too long to be fully incorporated in the main text of this article. We worked rather focused in 
analyzing the two cases as our main goal was to compare the two cases. We didn’t have the 
space to make lengthy in-depth single case study descriptions in the main text. We have 
always tried to fully substantiate the scoring on the variables in the consecutive rounds of 
the two cases by using case specific references and examples, and citations of respondents. 
However, we have also provided the full-length case descriptions in the appendix (which can 
be obtained online at the journal's website). This is done for making the case description and 
interpretation process as transparent as possible.  
 
4. Vitality in action: case analysis of Haringvliet and Grevelingen 
In this section we analyze both cases. First the case Haringvliet, and second the case 
Grevelingen is analyzed and scored on level of vitality and the distinguished conditions. 
 
4.1 Case introduction Haringvliet Sluices  
 
The Haringvliet sluices are one of the Dutch Delta Works which were built in reaction to the 
dramatic North Sea storm flood of 1953. The sluices, finished in 1971, closed off the estuary 
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from the North Sea, leading to the disappearance of the estuarial tides and turning the 
Haringvliet into a fresh water basin. Although this was specifically beneficial for water safety, 
agriculture and fresh water supply in the area, the closing off has led to increasing 
sedimentation of suspended material and a damaging of estuarine ecological values and 
natural habitats (e.g. hindering the migration of fish). In line with the changing paradigm on 
water management (towards more Integrated Water Resources Management) and in 
reaction to the negative ecological and natural developments, the national water authorities 
(the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the national 
governmental agency Rijkswaterstaat) developed a policy plan in order to restore the natural 
transition between river and sea in various steps. As a first step it was decided to open the 
Haringvliet sluices slightly (leave them ajar) during periods of high tides, allowing brackish 
North Sea water into the Haringvliet. Although this first step would not improve tidal 
dynamics, it was considered to be at least of direct value for enhancing the migration of fish, 
which served international agreements on this issue, codified in the Rhine Action Program. 
However, opening the sluices leads to a higher level of salinity, which has negative 
consequences for different users of the fresh water basin, such as farmers and water 
companies. Key stakeholders (e.g. water boards and drinking water companies) therefore 
raised significant objections concerning the risks of fresh water availability. We will focus our 
analysis on the moment national government formally decided to change the management 
of the sluices (in 2000). An important condition for implementation was that the intakes for 
water for drinking and agriculture should be relocated before the sluices could be opened 
(part of the so-called ‘compensating measures’). In this way, the functionality of the 
freshwater intakes would be secured. To meet this condition, Rijkswaterstaat sought 
cooperation with the water boards and the province to develop freshwater canals.  
 
4.2 The evolution of vitality in different rounds  
Table 2 Scores on vitality in different rounds case Haringvliet 
Vitality scores Round I (2000-2004) Round II (2005-2010) Round III (2010-medio 
2013) 
Energetic: lively 
exploration of   
perspectives, 
interests and 
values (1-5) 
 
2 (-) Partly exploration of 
different land use functions 
in the development of fresh 
water canals, but 
dominance of ecological 
and natural values. 
1 (--) Focus of national and 
provincial government on 
implementation, also using 
top-down planning 
mechanisms.  
3 (+/-) Reconsideration of 
fresh water routes by the 
province, together with 
local stakeholders. Area 
vision building of regional 
stakeholders  
Productive: 
consolidation 
(exploitation) by 
finding common 
ground (1-5) 
2 (-) Partly alignment 
between national en 
provincial government (in 
interests and time 
orientation). No alignment 
with local government, 
water boards and regional 
1 (--) No common ground 
between the actors involved. 
Increasing resistance of 
regional stakeholders and 
procedural conflicts between 
governmental levels. 
3 (+/-) Increasing common 
ground among 
governmental levels and 
between stakeholders. 
First steps in development 
of business case 
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stakeholders.  
Vitality total score 
(2-10) 
4 (-) 2 (--) 6 (+/-) 
 
In the first round we observe a low level of vitality. There is partly exploration and 
consolidation between national and provincial government, but no joint exploration and no 
or weak consolidation with regional key stakeholders: water boards, local governments, and 
local farmers, and water companies. The province and national government jointly explored 
the connection between a provincial project about nature development and the 
development of fresh water canals as part of the decision to change the management of the 
Haringvliet sluices. This exploration led to inclusion of some other land use functions, namely 
water retention, recreation, and nature development. National governmental interests with 
regard to realizing fish migration and tidal dynamics were strongly aligned with provincial 
interests in nature development (Interviews national government and province). This 
common ground is consolidated in an administrative agreement between national 
government and the province, in which the province gets full administrative responsibility 
for realizing the compensating measures. Furthermore, there is partly common ground in 
time orientation between national government (RWS) and the province as both are part of a 
joint policy orientation in which current and future water issues in the South West Delta are 
being addressed and being discussed. However, regional stakeholders and fresh water users 
are not part of this process. Next, the interests of regional stakeholders (water boards, 
municipalities, and local farmers) clashed with those of the province and of national 
government. As a respondent of the water board notes: “Despite of the compliant attitude of 
the water board [at the island Goeree Overflakkee], the water board always fostered some 
suspicion against the province. The interests of both parties are too different in this matter.” 
The inclusion of agriculture and economic development, important for regional 
stakeholders, was avoided. As the manager of RWS notes: “We invested above all on 
reducing the concerns [of the key stakeholders]. […] We did then not invested in a joint area 
vision where a part of their vision was included.” 
In the second round we observe increasing resistance of regional stakeholders and 
procedural conflicts between governmental levels. Due to increasing local resistance of 
farmers and inhabitants, the councils of local governments on Goeree-Overflakkee and 
Voorne Putten reject the nature development projects, which include the compensating 
measures for changing the management of the sluices. This illustrates a very low level of 
common ground. At the same time, the communication and cooperation between national 
government and the province decreased (Kuijken, 2010). In this round, national government 
is acting more on the back ground. For example, national government is not participating in 
the policy and decision-making process concerning the fresh water canals anymore 
(Interviews national government). In the same line, national government is less actively 
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involved in the policy orientation process with regard to the future fresh water availability in 
the South West Delta. Interests beyond the regional and local level, such as the issue of 
climate change and its possible effects on the fresh water availability in the (mid-)long term 
are not included in this process, as the advice report of the Advisory Board for Rural Area 
also notes (RLG, 2008). 
In the third round we observe joint exploration and increasing common ground, which is 
beginning to consolidate. At the end of 2009 the Province decided to reconsider the 
proposed fresh water canals, and to explore new fresh water routes together with local 
stakeholders. At Voorne Putten, an interaction process with many local and regional 
stakeholders was set up. There were frequent interactions, and the process aimed to 
develop a freshwater route, taking into account the regional stakes as much as possible. As 
one of the respondents of the local government notes: “the province is now more open for 
the input and perspective of local stakeholders”. This resulted in a specific location and form 
of the freshwater route, which is accepted by local stakeholders, local government and the 
Water Board. At the island of Goeree-Overflakkee a more integrative area development is 
now being developed. Since 2011, the province, local government and non-governmental 
stakeholders (environmental interest organizations), with assistance of and in coordination 
with national government, are jointly working on an area vision. The fresh water route (the 
compensating measure for changing the management of the Haringvliet Sluices) is now 
coupled to an integrative area development, in which recreation and sustainable energy is 
included, which particularly serves regional interests. Consolidation of this common ground 
is reflected in the administrative agreement between the province and the local 
governments in 2012 and the development of a business case between public and private 
actors (specifically aimed at developing sustainable wind energy, but in relation with the 
integrative area development) (province South-Holland, 2013). The first steps are now taken 
in the preparation of the execution of this integrative area development project.  
4.3 The evolution of conditions of vitality in different rounds  
Table 3 Scores on conditions of vitality in different rounds case Haringvliet 
Conditions of Vitality Round I (2000-2004) Round II (2005-2010) Round III (2010-present) 
- Presence of policy 
urgency 
4 (+) Top down policy 
urgency, partly 
connected with 
provincial policy agenda 
3 (+/-) Moderate top 
down policy urgency, not 
strongly expressed 
4 (+) Top down policy 
urgency, strongly 
expressed towards the 
region.  
- Presence of bottom 
up urgency 
1 (--) no bottom up 
urgency  
1 (--) no bottom up 
urgency  
3 (+/-) Bottom up 
urgency regarding 
integral area 
development is 
increasing 
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Shared sense of urgency 5 (+/-) 4 (-) 7 (+/-) 
- Set up of multi-actor 
face to face, informal 
meetings 
 
1 (--) No multi-actor face 
to face informal 
meetings. Contacts 
between key 
stakeholders are highly 
formal 
1 (--) No multi-actor face 
to face informal 
meetings. Contacts 
between key 
stakeholders are highly 
formal 
 
4 (+) Increasing 
interaction between a 
variety of stakeholders. 
Ad hoc meetings are 
organized with an 
informal character 
- Channeling frequent 
information 
exchange organized 
by boundary 
spanners 
2 (-) Very little boundary 
spanning activities. Only 
between parts of 
national government and 
the province.  
1 (--) The different 
governmental levels are 
disconnected. Little to no 
information exchange 
and boundary spanning 
activity. 
4 (+) There is high 
information exchange 
and boundary spanning 
activity across different 
government levels. Local 
stakeholders are 
increasingly connected  
Cross-boundary informal 
network 
3 (-) 2 (--) 8 (+) 
- Due deliberation 
among actors in the 
system 
2 (-) Deliberation 
between a small amount 
of actors 
1 (--) Hard-nosed 
bargaining between 
initiating actors and 
individual stakeholders 
4 (+) Increasing arguing 
and mutual learning 
between actors at 
different levels and of 
different domains  
- Open and inclusive 
dialogue 
1 (--) No open and 
inclusive dialogue  
1 (--) Positions of 
different actors are fixed.  
No open dialogue 
4 (+) The dialogue is 
open for different 
interests, values and 
stakeholders  
Constructive Dialogue 3 (-) 2 (--) 8 (+) 
- Actors keep in 
mind the 
intentions of the 
other parties in 
finding solutions 
2 (-) Actors are little 
focused on keeping in 
mind the intention of 
other parties 
1 (--) Actors are not 
taking into account other 
parties’ intentions.  
3 (+/-) Actors are 
increasingly taking other 
parties’ intentions into 
account in finding 
common solutions 
- Opportunistic 
behaviour 
2 (-) There is little 
opportunistic behaviour 
1 (--) Opportunistic 
behaviour between 
certain key actors 
3 (+/-) There is no to little 
opportunistic behaviour 
between actors 
Trust 4 (-) 2 (--) 6 (+/-) 
- Presence of a 
joint working 
structure, like 
project group, 
3 (-) Project group 
including small amount 
of actors, resulting in an 
administrative 
1 (--) National 
government is not part of 
project group anymore, 
acts on a distance 
2 (-) There is a working 
group. Previous 
administrative 
agreements are ended.  
14 
 
steering group, 
etc. 
agreement in which 
responsibilities are 
divided.  
- The level that 
these rules are 
used to structure 
the interaction 
process 
1 (--) Interaction rules 
(scope, information 
exchange, coordination) 
are not elaborated.  
1 (--) Much ambiguity 
about the administrative 
agreement: announced 
agreements are not 
elaborated.  
2 (-) Informal rules 
between actors. There is 
now being negotiated 
about new agreements 
between the 
governmental levels. 
Regional actors are 
working on a business 
case. 
Institutional cooperation 
arrangement 
4 (-) 2 (--) 4 (-) 
Summed score conditions 
of vitality (out of 50) 
19 12 33 
 
There is a big difference between the scores of the conditions of vitality in the first two 
rounds on the one hand and the third round on the other hand. All conditions score higher in 
the third round (with an exception of institutional cooperation arrangement). Comparing the 
second and third round cross-boundary informal network and constructive dialogue increase 
the most: both show an increase of 6 points. In the first and second round, the cross-
boundary interaction between the water boards, the local governments and the initiating 
actors (province and national government) is weak (cf. Kuijken, 2010). People within these 
organizations don’t find each other easily. As one of the respondents of the Water board 
notes: “You miss the informal network. In previous times, you just called somebody from the 
department Water of the province if there was a problem…, and then you solved this jointly. 
Now, there are many people working who do not have that feeling for what is important for 
water boards.” The contacts are mainly organized in the form of administrative meetings or 
via formal correspondence. As a respondent illustratively notes: “National government was 
not part of the Steering Committee Compensating Measures. We [policy department Water 
of national government] did not receive the administrative minutes or notes. […] We were 
not aware of what was happening in the region.” In the third round cross-boundary 
interaction is far more present. At different positions, new persons are active who are willing 
to cross boundaries and relatively easily know to find each other. Information exchange 
between different actors has strongly increased. National government is part of the Steering 
Committee again and is also present in the meetings with regional stakeholders. As a 
respondent of national government notes: “I have good contacts with [representative of 
local government]. I know to find her. […] It is important that you also make the effort to go 
to the region. […] That informal process…Are you receptive, and approachable? […] Are you 
able to put yourself in the position of the region? I think that’s important […], these informal 
15 
 
contacts are really important.” Furthermore, face to face meetings between representatives 
of local government, regional stakeholders (environmental organizations), national 
government, and representatives of the agriculture community are organized in which 
connections between policy agendas are explored.  
With regard to the condition constructive dialogue, the interaction between the 
managing actors (the initiators) and local/regional stakeholders was in the first two rounds 
mainly characterized by informing and sometimes consulting. There were no real attempts 
to include the diversity of interests in a mutually constructive way. Interactions were 
focused on reducing concerns instead of joint vision building. In the last round a more 
constructive dialogue emerged. On the island of Voorne Putten an interactive planning 
process between the province and local stakeholders was set up in which the location and 
form of the compensating measures were being discussed on the basis of arguing and 
mutually acceptance of the differences in interests at stake. As one of the managers of the 
province notes: “The group comes together every three weeks till the summer of 2010 [since 
March; a period of more or less five moths]. The actors are getting the feeling that they are 
serious listened to and they now really do have influence in the planning process.” Also on 
the island of Goeree-Overflakkee a constructive dialogue between national government and 
local stakeholders took place around an integral area vision in which different interests 
across governmental scales are included.  
In the last round trust between actors also increases substantially. The first two rounds 
are characterized by a low level of trust between the regional stakeholders on the one hand 
and the initiating actors – the province and RWS – on the other hand. Different respondents 
indicate that regional stakeholders do not think that the province and RWS really keep their 
interests in mind and vice versa. As one of the respondents of the Water Board notes: “The 
region had the feeling that its interests and input was not taken up seriously.” When it comes 
to ‘opportunistic behavior’, different respondents note that actors mainly pursue their own 
agenda, which frustrates cooperation. For example, there are different conflicts between the 
province and the water board. Both actors blame each other for trying to “get more out of 
[the administrative agreement] than there is in it. You jointly decide to buy a bike, but along 
the way it turns out to be a Ferrari.” as one respondent illustratively notes. In the last round, 
the level of trust between local stakeholders, the province, and national government starts 
to increase. According to the respondents, they now have the feeling that their interests are 
taken up more seriously and that the managing actors are far more prepared to look for 
connections with the local policy agendas.  
In the first two rounds there are two administrative agreements: between national 
government and the Province and between the province and the water board. However, 
rules about information exchange, scoping, and decision rules remained implicit. 
Cooperation or coordination mechanisms were not developed. This caused different 
perceptions about which principles were leading (e.g. with regard to the needed budget and 
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the necessity of dike improvements). An evaluation report of national government notes the 
following about the administrative agreements in the second round: “Many times 
agreements remained implicit or where pushed forward. For example, in both the 
administrative agreements between the national government and the province (in 2004) as 
between the province and the water board (in 2006), it was stated that certain specific 
agreements had to be made in advance. However, this did not happened…” (Kuijken, 2010: 
8). In the last round regional and national governmental actors are jointly, together with the 
responsible private actors for drinking water, developing new administrative arrangement in 
which coordination and cooperation, as well as financial responsibilities and risks, are 
elaborated.  
4.4 Confronting level of vitality with conditions of vitality 
There is a low level of vitality in the first two rounds, especially in the second round. Overall, 
we observe the same pattern with regard to the conditions of vitality (they have a low score 
in the first round and these scores further decrease in the second round). Vitality reaches a 
moderate level in the third round. Most of the conditions score much better in this third 
round. When we compare the  second and third round we see that they all increased. 
Regarding the relationship between the various conditions: it is interesting to see that, 
coming from a low level of vitality, things are beginning to change with different persons 
being active in the network (or some people taking a different role). These people have been 
conducting more boundary spanning work than was done in the previous rounds. This 
boundary spanning work is strongly related with a constructive dialogue taking place 
between the various actors and these two conditions seem to catalyze trust between the 
various actors. The different actors seek to find appropriate institutional cooperation 
arrangements now. This is now being developed, but it seemed to be important to first build 
trust between the various actors. 
4.5 Case introduction Grevelingen 
As a reaction on the major flooding disasters in 1906 and 1953 in the Southwest part of the 
Netherlands, the national government executed some major interventions in the water 
defense system (De Schipper, 2008; Slager, 2010). As a result of these interventions, which 
are known as the ‘Delta works’, the Southwest Delta with its characterizing estuarine 
dynamics transformed in several lakes losing its dynamics and connection with the North 
Sea, which causes several ecological problems. One of the lakes in which the ecological 
problems are prevalent is the lake Grevelingen. The lake Grevelingen is a salt water basin, 
because of a little culvert in the Brouwersdam (created in 1978), connecting it with the 
North Sea. However, this culvert proved not to be enough for providing the lake Grevelingen 
with enough oxygen. This led to deterioration of the water quality. In 2006, the national 
water authority started an exploration on the consequences of reintroducing estuarine 
dynamic in the lake Grevelingen. In subsequent years, more studies followed but an ultimate 
solution never has been implemented.  
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4.6 The evolution of vitality in different rounds 
 
Table 4 Scores on vitality in different rounds case Grevelingen 
 Vitality scores Round I (2005-
2006) 
Round II (2006-
2009) 
Round III (2009-
2012) 
Round IV (2012-mid-
2013) 
Energetic: lively 
exploration of   
perspectives, 
interests and 
values (1-5) 
5 (++) Much 
exploration of 
economical en 
nature 
perspectives  
3 (+/-) Average 
exploration only in 
inner circle  
 5 (++) High degree of 
exploration by broad 
network of actors 
5 (++) High degree of 
exploration by broad 
network of actors 
Productive: 
consolidation 
(exploitation) 
by finding 
common 
ground (1-5) 
3 (+/-) average 
consolidation. Only 
partly alignment of 
interests.  
4 (+) above average 
consolidation 
shown by integral 
vision. Only partly 
alignment for time 
orientation   
5 (++) high 
consolidation 
illustrated by 
common ground 
(interests and time 
orientations) 
5 (++) high degree of 
consolidation 
illustrated by 
common ground 
(interests and time 
orientations) 
Vitality total 
score (2-10) 
8 (+) 7 (+/-) 10 (++ ) 10 (++)  
 
The Grevelingen proved to be a case with high level of vitality although the level varied 
during the different decision rounds studied. Formal moments of consolidation played a 
crucial role to revitalize the network. Lively moments of exploration were interspersed with 
moments of consolidation. In the first round, the level of vitality in the case Grevelingen was 
high. The first round started with a broad deliberation (in townhouses) in 2005 with lively 
interaction about the future of the lake in which all actors had the possibility to participate. 
The network was full of energy and perspectives, interests and values were actively 
explored. The broad deliberation led to an awareness of the issues in the lake Grevelingen. 
Other part of a vital governance network is the consolidation. In this round we see an active 
search to find common ground by working on a joint vision for the lake. Nevertheless, in this 
phase the Nature and Recreation Authority is not fully able to consolidate this common 
ground (no concrete projects and ratified vision). In the spring of 2006 a first version of the 
integral vision was presented to stakeholders but it took until 2007 to determine the integral 
vision. In this phase we see roughly aligned interests and values but only partly aligned time 
orientations. There were actors with more short time orientations (merely entrepreneurs) 
while the national water authority preferred a rather long term orientation. 
In the second round the level of vitality is a little bit lower (average). The earlier 
mentioned deliberation round in this round resulted in an integral vision (ratified by 17 
organizations). Common ground related to interest and values was consolidated. This also 
resulted in the elaboration of concrete projects.  The vision however is less clear in its time 
orientation. No clear point on the horizon is formulated and no time schedule is written 
down. Time horizons of actors have not been aligned so far. After determining the vision, 
interaction on the scale of the basin became more irregularly. The problems related to the 
water quality were not included in spatial developments, but were studied apart in a SNIP-
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study carried out by the National Water Authority (start in 2006). Outcomes of the study 
were only shared occasionally in conferences. The years 2007 and 2008 were marked by 
exploration of the water quality issues in the SNIP-study and exploration of concrete projects 
related to economic issues. The interaction became less intensive for the broad circle of 
stakeholders. However, at the inner core (project team) the communication around the 
water quality issue was augmenting. In 2009 the results of the SNIP-exploration were 
officially presented. The conclusions led to more consolidation of interests and values (a 
common project-document). In sum, the vitality in this period proved to be average (average 
exploration, above average consolidation). 
In the third round the level of vitality is very high (both exploration and consolidation 
augmented). By the start of the MIRT-exploration (follow-up of the SNIP-study) lively 
exploration of perspectives, interests and values took place. Like the project manager said: 
“Integrality was the magic word”. The exploration did not stop further on in the MIRT-
exploration. The project organization internalized water safety issues in the project (using 
the Grevelingen for water storage). Moreover, two times a year the project organization 
organized well attended (200 attendees) Grevelingen conferences in which the broad debate 
about the future of the Grevelingen was facilitated. In this round we also see moments of 
consolidation. The first moment was with the presentation of the starting document of the 
MIRT-exploration. In this document the project organization consolidated the previously 
developed common ground. “Ecology, economy and safety needed as much as possible to be 
combined in the solutions”, was the explicit mission of the steering committee (NRA, 2010). 
A second moment of consolidation can be seen in the internalization of the water safety 
issue into the project. Finding solutions for water storage became one of the project goals of 
the MIRT-exploration. Thereby the Grevelingen was seen within the larger picture of the 
Southwest Delta. At the end of the MIRT-exploration the vitality was put to the proof. The 
commonly developed grounds in terms of interests, values and time orientations were 
frustrated by the lack of money to bring measures to implementation. However, this lack of 
money did not bring the governance network into inertia. By combining the planning studies 
of the lake Volkerak Zoom and the lake Grevelingen in a national planning document, 
consolidation of the developed common ground took place. Time orientations were 
mitigated. Time horizons for implementation constrainedly had to be stretched. The 
postponing of the proposed measures did not lead to unhooking of actors in the governance 
network.  
In the fourth round the level of vitality is also very high with lively exploration of 
perspectives, interests and values. Like one of our respondents said: ‘It seems that we are 
doing all explorations anew, just to buy time for decision making’. This was for example true 
for the studies to use the lake Grevelingen for water storage. Because of the synergetic 
benefits this possibility was further studied. Like in the former round, the level of 
consolidation is also very high. The possibility of water storage in the Grevelingen in the 
future was consolidated in the national Delta program 2013 and 2014 (national policy 
document). Next to this, in the spring of 2013 the project team of the National Planning 
Document started an intensive deliberation process with several stakeholders to find solid 
and supported decision information. This took place through a series of workshops in which 
all alternatives for both lakes were studied and rated. The results of this interactive process 
were included in both the starting document of the National Planning document and further 
studies. It is both a form of exploration and consolidation. Furthermore on June 6th 2013 a 
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strategic consultation with the minister of Public works was used to consolidate the 
developed common ground. The different time orientations of public and private actors in 
this round were more and more aligned.  
4.7 The evolution of conditions in different rounds  
The in the former paragraph described level of vitality stands not on its self but was 
accompanied by the presence of several conditions. In this section the conditions for a vital 
governance network are empirically discussed. We do this by focusing on two central 
elements: 
- The overall conditional scores 
- The development of two striking conditional scores 
 
Table 5 Scores on conditions of vitality in different rounds case Grevelingen 
Conditions of 
Vitality 
Round I (2005-
2006) 
Round II (2006-
2009) 
Round III (2009-
2012) 
Round IV (2012-
mid 2013) 
- Presence of 
policy 
urgency 
 
 
- Presence of 
bottom up 
urgency 
 
 
 
1 (--) No top down 
policy urgency 
 
 
3 (+/-) Average 
degree of bottom 
up urgency 
 
2 (-) Low degree of 
top down policy 
urgency  
 
5(++)Very high 
degree of bottom 
up urgency  
 
3 (+/-)Average top 
down policy 
urgency  
 
 
 
5(++) Very high 
degree of bottom 
up urgency 
 
 
 
3 (+/-)Average top 
down policy 
urgency 
 
 
 
 
5(++) Very high 
degree of bottom 
up urgency  
 
 
Sense of urgency 4 (-) 7 (+/-) 8 (+) 8 (+) 
- Channeling 
frequent 
information 
exchange 
organized 
by 
boundary 
spanners 
 
- Set up of 
multi-actor 
face to face, 
informal 
meetings 
 
5 (++) Very much 
information 
exchange  
 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Informal face 
to face meetings  
2 (-) Barely 
information 
exchange in broad 
network  
 
 
 
 
3 (+/-) ad hoc 
informal meetings 
in inner circle 
5 (++) Frequent  
information 
exchange  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Informal 
multi-actor 
meetings  to share 
MIRT-results and 
initiate projects  
5 (++) Frequent 
information 
exchange  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Many 
informal meetings  
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Cross-boundary 
informal network 
10 (++) 
 
5 (+/-) 
 
10 (++) 
 
10 (++) 
 
- Due 
deliberation 
among 
actors in the 
system 
- Open and 
inclusive 
dialogue 
4 (+) Due 
deliberation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Open and 
inclusive dialogue  
3 (+/-) Average due 
deliberation  
 
 
 
 
 
4 (+)More bilateral 
negotiations, open 
dialogue between a 
few organizations 
 
4 (+) Due 
deliberation  
 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Open and 
inclusive dialogue 
within project goals  
 
5 (++) Very due 
deliberation  
 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Open and 
inclusive dialogue 
within project goals    
 
Constructive 
Dialogue 
9 (+) 
 
7 (+/-) 
 
9 (+) 
 
10 (++) 
 
- Actors keep 
in mind the 
intentions 
of the other 
parties in 
finding 
solutions 
 
- Opportunist
ic behavior 
2 (-) Actors do not 
know each other 
well  
 
 
4 (+) No signs 
opportunistic 
behaviour 
4 (+) Intentions of 
other actors are 
taken into account  
 
 
5 (++) No 
opportunistic 
behaviour 
5 (++) Very high. 
Intentions of others 
are fully taken into 
account  
 
 
 
5 (++) No 
opportunism 
4 (+) Level of trust 
is ok, but duration 
of process leads to 
little decrease of 
trust 
 
 
 
4 (+) Hardly 
opportunism  
Trust 6 (+/-) 
 
9 (+) 
 
10 (++) 
 
8 (+) 
 
- Presence of 
a joint 
working 
structure, 
like project 
group, 
steering 
group, etc. 
 
- The level 
that these 
rules are 
used to 
structure 
the 
interaction 
process 
4 (+) Cooperation 
between primarily 
regional 
stakeholders in 
NRA 
 
 
 
 
 
3 (+/-) Interaction 
rules are used but 
ad hoc 
4 (+) Cooperation 
between primarily 
regional 
stakeholders in 
Nature and 
Recreation 
authority  
 
 
4 (+) functioning 
Grevelingen 
alliance  
5 (++) Cooperation 
in Steering 
committee 
Grevelingen, 
Steering 
Committee 
Southwest delta, 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Structured 
working process  
5 (++) Steering 
committee 
Southwest Delta,  
Project teams 
regional economic 
program 
 
 
 
 
5 (++) Structured 
working process 
Institutional 
cooperation 
arrangement 
7 (+/-) 
 
8 (+) 
 
10 (++) 
 
10 (++) 
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Summed score 
conditions of vitality 
(out of 50) 
36 36 47 46 
 
Overall, the case Grevelingen scores high on the different conditions of vitality. In the first 
two rounds the summed score of the conditions is 36 of a maximum of 50. There are only a 
few striking low scores, the sense of urgency in the first round (4) and the cross boundary 
informal network (5) in the second round. In the third round we see a boost in the overall 
score, 47 of a maximum of 50. From the second to the third round, every single condition 
has a higher score. The increase is especially caused by a large increase of cross-boundary 
informal network and a moderate increase of constructive dialogue and institutional 
cooperation arrangement. In the fourth round the scores merely stabilize (overall score of 
46), except a little decrease in trust. 
When we have a closer look on the above presented scores on the different 
conditions, the first striking condition is the sense of urgency. The sense of urgency consists 
of two indicators, respectively the presence of policy urgency and, secondly the presence of 
bottom up urgency. In the first decision round the sense of urgency is relatively low. Due to a 
broad deliberation process started in 2005 the bottom up urgency started to grow. Like the 
project manager said: “We went evening to evening to town houses to talk with stakeholders 
and local residents”. However, there was no top down policy urgency for the issues. The 
average bottom-up urgency (developed in the first round) grew out to a high degree of 
bottom-up urgency in the second round. This can be seen in the fact that regional 
governments lobbied for a study of the water quality in the lake Grevelingen. The top down 
policy urgency was still low. Like one of our respondents said: “Until 2027 the national 
government is not tied to do something in the Grevelingen”.  
In the third round, we see a shift in the sense of urgency which is high due to  the 
very high bottom up urgency and an average level of top down policy urgency. The 
Grevelingen from that moment was seen as a possibility for water storage, an issue with high 
policy urgency in the Netherlands. In the fourth round the sense of urgency was also high  
(water safety urgency).  
The second striking condition is cross-boundary informal networks.. In the first round 
the cross-boundary informal network condition scored very high. There was very much 
information exchange initiated by boundary spanners and there were frequent face to face 
informal meetings with the goal to “set an agenda for the Grevelingen” (Projectmanager). In 
the second round we see a drop in this conditional score to average. Informal multi-actor 
face to face meetings became scarcer and information exchange in a broad network on the 
scale of the basin was barely initiated. More bilateral interaction patterns occurred around 
concrete projects and the SNIP-exploration was a “more internal governmental study” 
(National water authority). In the third round the condition scored very high. The MIRT-
exploration was much more public orientated with frequent information exchange and face 
to face informal meetings (Grevelingen conferences). This was continued in the fourth 
round.     
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4.7 Confronting level of vitality with conditions of vitality  
The Grevelingen (although the level varied) proved to be a case with a high level of vitality. 
During the last two decision rounds the level of vitality reached its highest point when 
aligned time orientations and aligned interests and values got illustrated in joint visions and 
concrete plans. When we confront the level of vitality with the conditions of vitality, we are 
able to deduct some conclusions. Where the degree of vitality proved to be relative stable in 
time, the conditions proved to be more fluctuating in time. There is however a big 
correlation between the overall level of vitality and the summed score of conditions of 
vitality in every decision making round. This leads to the preliminary conclusion that the 
identified conditions highly explain the level of vitality in governance networks. Furthermore 
we can conclude that the conditions of vitality seem to be reversible in vital networks. Let us 
have a closer look on this conclusion. In the first round we see a low level of the sense of 
urgency and we see a very high level of cross boundary informal network while in the second 
round we see an average sense of urgency and an average level of cross boundary informal 
network. The augmented sense of urgency intercepted the drop of the cross boundary 
informal network in the summed score. Moreover we see an augmenting level of trust in the 
first three rounds of the decision making process while the constructive dialogue is 
decreasing. Higher levels of trust seem to make due deliberation and open and inclusive 
dialogue less necessary. It is not easy to say which conditions were decisive but the role of 
formal cooperation structures in combination with a shared bottom-up sense of urgency and 
a lot of boundary spanning activities seem to be very important to keep the governance 
network vital. A last observation is the influence of new people in the governance network. 
New people bring new energy and new views which stimulate lively exploration of 
perspectives, interest and values.     
 
In the concluding section we compare the results from the two in-depth case studies and 
draw conclusion from this case comparison. 
 
5. Conclusions drawn from case comparative analysis 
In this article our goal was to find the conditions that can be considered important in 
developing and maintaining vitality of social systems in water governance practices. We 
elaborated five conditions, i.e. (1) sense of urgency, (2) cross-boundary informal network, (3) 
constructive dialogue, (4) trust, and (5) institutional arrangements; these five conditions are 
frequently discussed and recurring themes in literature on social-ecological systems, (water) 
governance, and network theory. We then conducted a comparative qualitative case study 
research in which we dealt with two Dutch (water governance) cases: Haringvliet Sluices and 
Grevelingen; both cases are located in the southwestern delta region of the Netherlands. 
This comparative case study research delivers us a couple of insights in the 
interrelationship between on the one hand the conditions and on the other hand vitality of 
social systems in water governance practices. We are able to draw two distinct conclusions 
from our case comparative research. The first conclusion is that the conditions can be 
treated as clear enablers and triggers for increasing the level of vitality in social systems in 
water governance practices; the identified conditions highly explain the level of vitality. In 
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both cases a low score on (most of) the conditions are accompanied with low scores on 
vitality. The case Haringvliet Sluices is the illustrative case in this respect, as this case overall 
scores relatively low on both during most rounds of decision-making.  However, it also the 
other way around: high scores on (most of) the conditions are also accompanied with high 
scores on the level of vitality. The second case, Grevelingen, is a clear illustration of this 
pattern as this case is overall more positive on the level of vitality in the social systems of the 
water governance practice. The level of the conditions and the level of vitality can be 
considered communicating vessels, as the observed upward changes in the level of vitality 
during the rounds of decision-making were accompanied with upward changes in the level of 
the conditions. The case Grevelingen for example shows us that the upward change of 
vitality during round 3 of the decision-making process (from a score of 7 to 10) coincides 
with a ‘jump’ in positive scores of all five conditions.  We can observe a similar pattern in the 
case of Haringvliet Sluices where vitality increases during rounds 2 and 3 (from a score 2 to 6 
in the third round). This increase in vitality also coincides with an increase in the scores on 
the conditions. Vitality can therefore also be considered a dynamic concept that can develop 
during the process of decision-making under the influence of the five distinguished 
conditions.   
The second conclusion that we can draw from our case comparative research deals 
with the relationship among the five distinguished conditions. We found two distinct type of 
relationships among the conditions: (1) a substituting, and (2) a mutually reinforcing 
relationship. In the first relationship, all conditions do not have the same (positive or 
negative) score in the same round of decision-making. Some negative scores on conditions 
are substituted (in the meaning of “compensated”)  by positive scores on other conditions. 
For example, in the case of Grevelingen in round 1 of the decision-making process a very 
high score on the presence of cross-boundary informal networks compensates for low score 
on sense of urgency, trust and institutional arrangements. In round 2 of that same case we 
see that a high score on trust substitutes for lower scores on the other variables. Hence, not 
the same condition is every time important for playing its substituting role in different 
rounds of the decision-making process. Each round has its specific process-related 
characteristics making different conditions important for maintaining the level of vitality. 
This makes vitality an organic concept which cannot be developed or maintained 
mechanistically by choosing just one fixed (set of) condition(s) at all times.   
The second relationship (i.e. mutual reinforcing relation among conditions) can be 
witnessed in both cases, but especially in the case of the Haringvliet Sluices as in the third 
round all conditions scored relatively positive (especially compared with the previous two 
rounds of decision-making). In this specific case we see a change with different persons 
being active in constructing boundary-crossing informal networking, which fuels constructive 
dialogue among actors in the social system and again this further catalyzes the development 
of trust. This influencing effect of boundary spanning work on dialogue development and 
trust building is also stressed in other literature (see: Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2014).  
The appearance of the two distinct relationships among conditions, i.e. the 
substituting and mutually reinforcing  views, can be explained by the sudden increased 
development of vitality in a specific round of decision-making and also relates to the first 
conclusion in which we dealt with ‘jumps in levels of vitality’. A combined relationship 
among conditions seems to be needed to realize significant increase in vitality of the social 
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system in water governance practices. Singular improvements in conditions can be 
considered not to be decisive for realizing a big, significant increase in the level of vitality. 
This is specifically illustrated by the Haringvliet case. In this case the level of vitality was 
considerably low. Substantive efforts on all conditions were needed to realize an increase in 
the vitality of the social system. Despite the substantive increase in the scores of the 
conditions, the level of vitality is still moderate and certainly not that high as it is in the 
Grevelingen case. Hence, effort and results on all conditions are needed to realize ‘jumps’ in 
vitality levels. On the other hand conditions can substitute each other as the score of level of 
vitality is already high (8-10). It is then more about maintaining the level of vitality, in which 
one or two conditions can be used but not all are necessary. In the Grevelingen case we see 
for example that the level of vitality in the first round of decision-making is already high 
(score 8), but not all conditions have a necessary positive score; cross-boundary informal 
networking (to a high extent) and constructive dialogue (to a lesser extent) are sufficient for 
keeping vitality at a high level. This distinction between maintenance and development of 
vitality in relationship with conditions needs however more thought and scientific research, 
as it was not the explicit focus in our research.  
From our study a couple of practical lessons learned for the governance of vitality in 
water governance processes can be formulated. One lesson learned is that much 
management effort has to be invested in drastically developing the vitality level in social 
systems. Actors have to invest all conditions to get social system vital. The other practical 
lesson learned is that once the social system has reached a reasonable level of vitality, this 
level can be maintained by strategic investment in one or two conditions. Management 
effort in starting up cross-boundary informal networking and trust-building seem crucial in 
this respect. However, simple measures cannot be given as social-ecological systems remain 
complex (highly unpredictable) by nature and need case and situation specific 
measurements in maintaining the level of vitality.  
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